Using Severability Doctrine to Solve the
Retroactivity Unit-of-Analysis Puzzle: A
Dodd-Frank Case Study
Hannah Garden-Monheitt
INTRODUCTION

An employee of a public company uncovers evidence that
her employer is misleading shareholders and regulators about
its financial position. Knowing that federal law protects whistleblowers employed by public companies, the employee reports
her concerns to a supervisor. After she files her complaint, the
company discharges her, and she brings a whistleblower retaliation claim against it. While her claim is pending, Congress passes omnibus financial reform legislation. Buried in the bill's sixteen hundred sections are five changes to the whistleblower
retaliation cause of action. For example, one provision bans
agreements to arbitrate whistleblower claims, while another establishes a jury-trial right.' The legislation is silent as to whether these or other changes apply retroactively to pending casesleaving courts to decipher the puzzle.
Should any of the five changes apply to the whistleblower's
pending case? If one provision applies retroactively, must the
other provisions also apply retroactively?
Current retroactivity doctrine fails to specify the appropriate unit of analysis for this determination-that is, exactly
which provisions should be analyzed. Similarly, the doctrine
provides no guidance as to when retroactive application of one
amendment is dependent on the retroactive application of a related amendment.
Resolution of this unit-of-analysis problem is increasingly important as questions of statutory interpretation come to dominate
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federal dockets.2 Lengthy, complex enactments are now commonplace.3 Such "legislative behemoths" present particular challenges for retroactivity doctrine: "The greater the number of
provisions a statute contains, the greater the number of possible
permutations" created when courts determine retroactive application of each provision on a provision-by-provision, case-by-base
basis.4 A piecemeal approach to retroactivity yields a hybrid regime, whereby the cause of action applicable to pending cases is
neither the original cause of action nor the updated cause of action.
This Comment examines the unit-of-analysis problem using
five provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Acts (Dodd-Frank) as a case study of retroactivity doctrine. Part I summarizes the whistleblower protections
for employees of public companies created by § 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX § 806),6 and discusses five Dodd-Frank
amendments to them.
Part II first introduces the Supreme Court's framework for
determining whether legislation applies retroactively, established in Landgraf v USI Film Products.7 As an example of the
difficulties associated with applying the Landgraf framework,
Part II then summarizes the dizzying patchwork of conflicting
lower-court decisions applying Landgraf to the Dodd-Frank
amendments to SOX § 806. In determining whether the DoddFrank amendments apply to pending § 806 cases, lower courts
have all assumed that the appropriate unit of analysis is a single Dodd-Frank provision, meaning retroactive application of
one amendment has no bearing on the retroactivity of the other
four amendments. In turn, Part III argues that lower courts
have incorrectly assumed that Landgraf supplied a default rule
of provision-by-provision analysis of retroactivity questions.
This Comment answers the retroactivity unit-of-analysis
question by borrowing insights from severability doctrine. When
2
See Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv L
Rev 405, 409 (1989).
3

See Glen S. Krutz, Hitching a Ride: Omnibus Legislating in the U.S. Congress 1-

2 (Ohio State 2001) (finding "an increased propensity to pass larger, bundled bills into
law" to be "one of the most major recent changes in the legislative process").
4

Kenneth A. Klukowski, Severability Doctrine: How Much of a Statute Should

Federal Courts Invalidate?, 16 Tex Rev L & Polit 1, 17-18 (2011).
5 Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376, 1841-49, 1852 (2010), codified in relevant part
at 18 USC § 1514A(a), (b)(2)(D)-(E), (e).
6
Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745, 802-04 (2002), codified as amended in relevant
part at 18 USC § 1514A.
7
511 US 244(1994).
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a statutory provision is unconstitutional, severability doctrine
asks whether certain provisions are so interrelated that they
must be invalidated together. Courts should deploy this severability test in retroactivity cases to determine which provisions
are so interrelated that all of them must either apply-or not
apply-to pending cases. In other words, courts should look to
severability doctrine to determine whether statutory provisions
may be temporally severed from one another. The Comment argues, however, that while in the severability context judicial
modesty recommends an assumption that statutory provisions
are independent of one another, the same modesty concerns call
for a different assumption in the retroactivity context-that related provisions are interdependent. Thus, courts should not
simply embrace wholesale application of the severability framework in the retroactivity context. By rejecting the assumption
that a single provision is always the appropriate unit of analysis
in retroactivity cases, courts can conserve judicial resources and
better allocate responsibility for determining whether a statute
applies retroactively to Congress.
I. CONGRESS CREATES, THEN REVISITS WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTIONS
This Part first provides background information on the original SOX § 806 whistleblower cause of action for employees of
public companies. It then describes the changes Dodd-Frank
made to that cause of action.
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
SOX provided new federal whistleblower protections for employees of public companies. Congress enacted SOX in 2002 in
response to a series of widely publicized corporate accounting
scandals, with the Enron collapse serving as the primary impetus for the legislation.8 Congressional hearings revealed that
would-be Enron whistleblowers had been silenced or fired, leading Congress to conclude that whistleblower protections are key
to uncovering complex, difficult-to-detect fraudulent schemes.9
Prior to SOX, "[c]orporate employees who report[ed] fraud [were]
8 See Richard A. Oppel Jr and Daniel Altman, In a Shift, Republicans Pledge to
Pass Accounting Bill, NY Times Cl (July 18, 2002).
9 See The Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, S Rep No
107-146, 107th Cong, 2d Sess 4-5 (2002).
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subject to the patchwork and vagaries of [ I state laws, although
most publicly traded companies [did] business nationwide."1o
SOX thus aimed to extend more predictable, uniform protection
to employees of public companies who report suspected fraud.
SOX § 806 created a cause of action for certain corporate
whistleblowers who experience retaliation for reporting suspected improprieties.', Under that section, a public company may
not "discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any
other manner discriminate against an employee" who participates in a proceeding related to violations of "section 1341 [mail
fraud], 1343 [wire fraud], 1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [securities
and commodities fraud], any rule or regulation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders."12 The provision also protects those who provide information regarding violations to an
enforcement agency, member or committee of Congress, or supervisor.13 Thus, a whistleblower may report suspected violations either internally to a supervisor, or externally to legislators or prosecutors. SOX also required covered employers to
establish procedures for handling whistleblower complaints
through their audit committees.14
Despite § 806's improvements to the whistleblower protection landscape, it was not perfect. Specifically, § 806 contained

10

Id at 10.

11 SOX § 806, 18 USC § 1514A. This Comment focuses on the private cause of action for retaliation against an employee of a public company. SOX also included other
whistleblower protections, including criminal liability for retaliatory interference with
the lawful employment of a person who provides information to law enforcement, SOX
§ 1107, 18 USC § 1513(e), and a narrow antiretaliation provision for securities analysts
employed by a broker or dealer who produce an unfavorable research report. SOX § 501,

15 USC § 780-6(a).

12 SOX § 806, 18 USC § 1514A(a). Some district courts and administrative law
judges (ALJs) hold that the suspected violation must relate to shareholder fraud, reading
the statutory phrase "relating to fraud against shareholders" as modifying all of the
enumerated criminal statutes. See Marcia E. Goodman and Courtney L. Anderson, Employment Issues in Securities Investigations, in Steven Wolowitz, Richard M. Rosenfeld,
and Lee H. Rubin, eds, Securities Investigations: Internal, Civil, and Criminal § 18,
§ 18:7.4 (PLI 2d ed 2012). See also Lawson v FMR LLC, 724 F Supp 2d 141, 158-60 (D
Mass 2010) (reviewing conflicting cases and finding violation must relate to shareholder
fraud), revd on other grounds, 670 F3d 61 (1st Cir 2012). Additionally, some district
courts and ALJs require "the complained-of conduct be material to an investor or shareholder." Laurence S. Moy, et al, Whistleblower Claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 1912 PLI-Corp 731, 767 (2011) (emphasis added).
13 See SOX § 806, 18 USC § 1514A(a)(1)(A)-(C).
14 See SOX § 301, 15 USC § 78j-1(m)(4).
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some ambiguity as to its coverage. A covered employer was defined as a
company with a class of securities registered under section
12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USC 781), or
that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USC 78o(d)) . . . , or any

officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such
company.15
Prior to Dodd-Frank, courts disagreed as to whether § 806 applied to private subsidiaries of covered publicly traded entities.16

To make out a prima facie case of prohibited retaliation
against a covered employer, the whistleblower must establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that: "(1) he engaged in protected activity under SOX; (2) his employer was aware of the protected activity; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action;
and (4) the protected activity was a contributing factor in the
adverse employment action."17 To receive protection, a whistleblower is not required to prove that the reported violation of the
fraud or securities laws actually occurred. Rather, a whistleblower need only have a reasonable belief that the conduct constitutes a violation.'s The burden then shifts to the employer to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
taken the adverse action against the employee even absent the
employee's protected conduct.19 A prevailing employee is entitled
15 SOX §806, 18 USC § 1514A(a).
16 See Goodman and Anderson, Employment Issues in Securities Investigations at
§ 18:7.3 (cited in note 12). A fair amount of uncertainty regarding the definition of "employee" remains even after Dodd-Frank. The First Circuit held coverage does not extend
to employees of contractors, subcontractors, or agents of publicly traded companies, and
it apparently did not view Dodd-Frank as changing this. See id; Lawson v FMR LLC, 670
F3d 61, 68 (1st Cir 2012) (interpreting "employee" after passage of Dodd-Frank to exclude employees of officers, employees, contractors, subcontractors, and agents of public
companies without considering the Dodd-Frank amendments). Whether this limitation
will be adopted in other jurisdictions is an open question. See Goodman and Anderson,
Employment Issues in Securities Investigations at § 18:7.3 (cited in note 12). Courts also
disagree as to whether the protection extends to employees working outside the United
States. See id. Furthermore, courts employ varying methods to assess whether someone
is an "employee" covered by the statute, as distinguished from an independent contractor. See Moy, et al, 1912 PLI-Corp at 743 (cited in note 12).
17 See William E. Hartsfield, 2 Investigating Employee Conduct § 12:34 at 12-202
(West rev ed 2012).
18 See SOX § 806, 18 USC § 1514A(a)(1).
19 See Hartsfield, 2 InvestigatingEmployee Conduct § 12:34 at 12-214 (cited in note
17); 49 USC § 42121(b) (explaining complaint procedure incorporated by 18 USC
§ 1514A).

1890

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:1885

to "all relief necessary to make the employee whole," including
reinstatement, back pay with interest, and special damages such
as litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees.20
Although the statute provides a federal cause of action, a
whistleblower seeking protection under § 806 cannot immediately bring his claim in court. Instead, an employee must first file a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor and may only bring an action in federal district court if the Secretary does not issue a final decision within 180 days.21 SOX provided a statute of limitations of ninety days from the date of the violation.22
Although Congress believed that the new whistleblowerretaliation cause of action created by SOX § 806 would encourage whistleblowers to come forward, "the Act's protections did
not produce a robust number of employee victories."23 Fourteen
hundred SOX claims were filed with the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) from SOX's enactment in
2002 to April 2009.24 Of the claims filed, "employees prevailed in
230 (including 210 cases that settled), employers prevailed in
930, and 186 complaints were voluntarily withdrawn."25 Empirical research shows that § 806 claims succeeded at a lower rate
than a broad range of other claims brought by employees and
other plaintiffs.26 For example, for claims under the Wendell H.
Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century-the statute on which § 806 procedures are based-claimants'
success rate is more than twice the rate of SOX whistleblowers
in OSHA investigations.27 Section 806 made significant progress
SOX § 806, 18 USC § 1514A(c).
See SOX § 806, 18 USC § 1514A(b)(1). Congress modeled this administrative
process on the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21). See Lawson, 670 F3d at 73 (observing that AIR 21 "was a model for at least
portions of the whistleblower protection provision of § 1514A, which incorporates the
procedures and burden-shifting framework of AIR 21"); 18 USC § 1514A(b)(2) (adopting
the rules and procedure of 49 USC § 42121(b)); Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment
and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21) § 519, Pub L No 106-181, 114 Stat 61,
146-48 (2000), codified at 18 USC § 42121(b). Within the Department of Labor, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is responsible for processing § 806
complaints, investigating them, issuing preliminary findings and orders, and adjudicating the complaint. See 29 CFR § 1980 et seq.
22 SOX § 806, 18 USC § 1514A(b)(2)(D).
20
21

23

Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why

Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 Wm & Mary L Rev 65, 67 (2007).
24 See Moy, et al, 1912 PLI-Corp at 734-35 (cited in note 12).
25 Id.
26 See Moberly, 49 Wm & Mary L Rev at 93 (cited in note 23).
27 See id.
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in the protections available to whistleblowers by providing a
uniform, federal cause of action for employees of public companies. These figures, however, make it unsurprising that Congress revisited whistleblowing incentives in Dodd-Frank.
B.

The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010

Despite the SOX reforms from 2002, the 2008 financial crisis made it clear that problems of accountability and transparency continued to plague the economy. Whereas SOX sought to
address the relatively narrow problem of corporate fraud, DoddFrank sought to remedy the 2008 financial crisis, which had
"myriad causes ... buried in a patchwork of problems touching
on almost every aspect of the financial services sector."28 Congress continued to believe that "[w]histleblowers provide a vital
early warning system to detect and expose fraud in the financial
system. With the right protections, whistleblowers can help root
out the kinds of massive Wall Street fraud that contributed to
the current financial crisis."29
Included among Dodd-Frank's sixteen hundred sections were
five amendments to the SOX § 806 whistleblower cause of action,
and several other new whistleblower programs not relevant to
this Comment.30 Dodd-Frank made the following additions and
28 The RestoringAmerican FinancialStability Act of 2010, S Rep No 111-176, 111th
Cong, 2d Sess 42 (2010).
29 Restoring American FinancialStability Act of 2010, S 3217, 111th Cong, 2d Sess,
in 156 Cong Rec S 4066 (daily ed May 20, 2010) (statement of Senator Edward Kaufman).
30 Generally speaking, Dodd-Frank "establishes different qualifications, paths, limitations and remedies for different whistleblowers." Hartsfield, 2 Investigating Employee
Conduct § 12:35 at 12-221 to -22 (cited in note 17). In addition to the changes discussed
in this Comment, Dodd-Frank created new whistleblower bounty programs under which
whistleblowers providing information to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
or the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) receive up to 30 percent of a
monetary award exceeding $1 million obtained in a judicial or administrative action
brought by the SEC or the CFTC. See Dodd-Frank § 922, 15 USC § 78u-6(b)-(c) (detailing the SEC bounty program); Dodd-Frank § 748, 7 USC § 26(b)-(c) (detailing the CFTC
bounty program). Dodd-Frank provides corresponding causes of action for whistleblowers
who experience retaliation from their employers because they provided information to
these commissions. See Dodd-Frank § 922, 15 USC § 78u-6(h); Dodd-Frank § 748, 7 USC
§ 26(h). A whistleblower falling within the scope of one of these retaliation provisions
may be able to elect to proceed under these statutes, bypassing the administrative procedures applicable under SOX § 806. See Hartsfield, 2 Investigating Employee Conduct
§ 12:35 at 12-223 (cited in note 17). Dodd-Frank also created "a new whistleblower cause
of action for employees who perform tasks related to the offering or provision of consumer financial products or services." Willis J. Goldsmith, Retaliation & Whistleblower
Claims, 880 PLI-Lit 423, 437 (2012); Dodd-Frank § 1057, 12 USC § 5567. Finally, the
statute modified the False Claims Act retaliation cause of action, establishing a federal
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changes to SOX § 806: (1) express coverage of certain subsidiaries of public companies, (2) coverage of national statistical ratings organizations, (3) an explicit jury-trial right provision, (4) a
longer statute of limitations, and (5) a prohibition of agreements
to waive or arbitrate claims.31
The first Dodd-Frank amendment adds express coverage of
certain subsidiaries of publicly traded companies to the statute
in an effort to "make clear" as to § 806's coverage, "eliminat[ing]
a defense now raised in a substantial number of actions brought
by whistleblowers."2 The second amendment "extend[s]" § 806's
coverage to nationally recognized statistical ratings organizations, because such organizations "played a significant role in
the unrealistic confidence in securities during our recent economic downturn."33 The third amendment adds a jury-trial
right.34 Prior to Dodd-Frank, courts held that § 806 whistleblowers did not have a right to a jury trial.3@ The fourth amendment
gives plaintiffs more time to bring a claim by extending the
statute of limitations from 90 to 180 days and by adopting the
discovery rule, which triggers the statute when the conduct is
discovered, as opposed to when the violation was committed.36
The fifth amendment invalidates agreements that waive § 806
rights and remedies, as well as predispute agreements to arbitrate § 806 claims37 Prior to Dodd-Frank, employers routinely
used blanket predispute arbitration agreements covering all
employment-related claims, and employers routinely included
waivers of § 806 claims in employee severance and settlement
agreements.38

statute of limitations and expanding the definition of protected conduct. See Dodd-Frank
§ 1079A(c), 31 USC § 3730(h); Hartsfield, 2 Investigating Employee Conduct § 12:35 at
12-223 (cited in note 17).
31 See Dodd-Frank §§ 922, 929A, 18 USC § 1514A(a), (b)(2)(D)-(E), (e).
32 S Rep No 111-176 at 114 (cited in note 28); Dodd-Frank § 929A, 18 USC
§ 1514A(a).
33
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Conference Report, S 5870,
111th Cong, 2d Sess, in 156 Cong Rec S 5872 (daily ed July 15, 2010) (statement of Senator Ben Cardin); Dodd-Frank § 922, 18 USC § 1514A(a).
34 See 18 USC § 1514A(b)(2)(E).
35
See Hartsfield, 2 Investigating Employee Conduct § 12:34 at 12-214 (cited in note 17).
36 See Dodd-Frank § 922, 18 USC § 1514A(b)(2)(D).
37 See Dodd-Frank § 922, 18 USC § 1514A(e). For a summary of other Dodd-Frank
provisions limiting or regulating the use of arbitration agreements in other financial settings, see Catherine Moore, The Effect of the Dodd-FrankAct on ArbitrationAgreements:
A Proposalfor Consumer Choice, 12 Pepperdine Disp Resol L J 503, 514-18 (2012).
38 See Goldsmith, 880 PLI-Lit at 438-39 (cited in note 30).
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Although § 4 of Dodd-Frank contained general effective-date
language, the legislation did not explicitly address whether any
of these five Dodd-Frank amendments to § 806 were to apply
retroactively to pending cases. 39 Part II of this Comment surveys
the cases attempting to fill this gap in the statute's language.
II. COURTS ADDRESS RETROACTIVITY ONE PROVISION AT A TIME

Since Dodd-Frank took effect on July 22, 2010,40 courts have
struggled to determine which, if any, of the five Dodd-Frank
amendments to the SOX § 806 whistleblower cause of action apply retroactively to pending cases. This Part begins with an introduction to the Supreme Court's framework for determining
whether civil legislation applies retroactively, established in
Landgraf v USI Film Products. It then summarizes cases applying this framework to the Dodd-Frank changes to § 806. In addressing whether Dodd-Frank applies retroactively, the lower
courts assumed that Landgraf supplied a default rule requiring
provision-by-provision analysis. The lower courts thus analyzed
each of the amendments to § 806 independently of one another.
A.

Landgraf v USI Film Products

In Landgraf, the Court articulated a two-prong test to determine whether a civil statute applies to conduct predating enactment. 41 First, a court looks for an express statement by Congress regarding the statute's proper temporal reach. If such a
directive exists, it controls. Absent an express statement, the
court moves to the second prong of the analysis, applying the
statute to pending cases only absent impermissible "retroactive
effects":
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the
events in suit, the court's first task is to determine whether
Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper
reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to
resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute
contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect,
i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when
he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or
39
40
41

See Dodd-Frank § 4, 124 Stat at 1390.
Dodd-Frank § 4, 124 Stat at 1390.
See Landgraf, 511 US at 280.
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impose new duties with respect to transactions already
completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our
traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.42
In explaining the concerns that animate the second prong, the
Landgraf Court articulated a distinction between provisions affecting contractual rights, in which retroactivity is disfavored,43
and provisions that affect jurisdiction or procedure, which raise
fewer concerns because they "regulate secondary rather than
primary conduct."" This distinction has played a central role in
lower court cases examining whether the Dodd-Frank provision
prohibiting arbitration of SOX claims applies to agreements
predating Dodd-Frank's enactment, as discussed in more detail
below.
The Landgraf Court argued that its two-prong framework
vindicates several goals of retroactivity doctrine. First, "a requirement that Congress first make its intention clear [before a
statute is given retroactive application] helps ensure that Congress itself has determined that the benefits of retroactivity
outweigh the potential for disruption or unfairness."45 The requirement of clear intent thus "allocates to Congress responsibility for fundamental policy judgments,"46 while also reducing the
"risk that [Congress] may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals."47 The Court also found its approach supported by a
background antiretroactivity principle articulated in several
constitutional provisions, a principle that "[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct
accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted."48
Unfortunately, the lower courts' attempts to apply the
Landgraftest to the five Dodd-Frank amendments to SOX § 806
have yielded unpredictable results. Courts have assumed without discussion that they should apply the two prongs of Landgraf to each Dodd-Frank provision individually. When treated in
42

Id.
See id at 271.
44 Id at 274-75.
45 Landgraf,511 US at 268.
46 Id at 273.
47 Id at 266.
48 Id at 265-67.
43
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this way, the retroactive application of one of the five provisions
is independent of the retroactive application of the other four
provisions. Further complicating the issue, courts frequently
disagree as to how the Landgraf prongs apply to even a single
Dodd-Frank provision. Accordingly, an unwieldy number of hybrid whistleblower protection schemes has emerged to govern
preenactment conduct.
B.

Dodd-Frank Held to Invalidate Existing Arbitration
Agreements

The fifth Dodd-Frank provision, which invalidates predispute agreements to arbitrate SOX § 806 whistleblower claims,
has engendered the most disagreement among courts and received the most attention. That provision provides that "[n]o
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if
the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising under
this section."49 In Pezza v Investors Capital Corp,50 the first district court to consider the issue applied the provision retroactively.51 The court denied the defendant's motion to compel arbitration, which the court had taken under advisement at the time of
Dodd-Frank's enactment. 52
The Pezza court found that the general effective-date language in Dodd-Frank failed to supply "an express congressional
intent regarding retroactivity."53 The court noted that three other Dodd-Frank provisions limiting predispute arbitration
agreements in other contexts contain express statements indirectly implicating retroactivity, but the court declined to draw a
negative inference from these provisions.54 The court explained
that given the "sprawling" nature of Dodd-Frank, "the presumption against the retroactive application of ambiguous statutory
provisions . . . [and] the national policy favoring arbitration of

claims that parties contract to settle in that manner," it could
not conclude that "Congress itself has affirmatively considered
the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined
that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits."55
49
50

Dodd-Frank § 922, 18 USC § 1514A(e)(2).
767 F Supp 2d 225 (D Mass 2011).

51

See id at 234.

See id at 227, 234.
Id at 228 (discussing § 4 of Dodd-Frank).
54 See Pezze, 767 F Supp 2d at 232.
55 Id (quotation marks and citations omitted).
52
53
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The Pezza court held that the arbitration provision "principally concerns the type of jurisdictional statute" that applies to
pending cases without creating retroactive effects.56 The court
explained that "statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction 'speak
to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations
of the parties."'"> In other words, the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate "takes away no substantive right but simply
changes the tribunal" and thus does not raise retroactivity
concerns.56
In a case considering the same Dodd-Frank arbitration provision, the Southern District of New York followed Pezza. The
plaintiff in Wong v CKX, Inc>> alleged she was terminated for internally reporting her concerns that the company had claimed
the wrong tax status in its SEC filings and was liable "for nearly
100 million dollars in back taxes to the United States government."60 The court applied the fifth Dodd-Frank provision to
prohibit arbitration of the dispute, which was pending at the
time of Dodd-Frank's enactment.61
While recognizing that four district courts had since disagreed with the Pezza court's retroactivity holding, the Wong
court nonetheless adopted the Pezza analysis.62 The court reasoned that there was "no clear answer" regarding congressional
intent and that "despite altering a provision of a contract," the
statute "primarily affects the jurisdiction of the court to hear the
substantive claim."63 Thus, it was "proper to apply the present
law to this dispute."64
Examining only the Dodd-Frank provision invalidating
agreements to arbitrate SOX § 806 claims, the Pezza and Wong
courts concluded that the provision applies retroactively because
it is best characterized as regulating procedural, rather than
substantive, aspects of the whistleblower cause of action. The
cases summarized in Part II.C reached the opposite conclusion,
Id at 233.
Id, quoting Landgraf,511 US at 274.
58 See Pezza, 767 F Supp 2d at 233, quoting Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 577
(2006).
s9 890 F Supp 2d 411 (SDNY 2012).
60 Id at 416.
61 See id at 417, 423. Oddly, although the case involved denial of the defendant's
motion to compel arbitration, the plaintiff herself had demanded arbitration of the employment dispute prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank, apparently unavailingly. See id at 416.
62 Id at 423 n 2.
63 Wong, 890 F Supp 2d at 422-23.
64 Id at 423.
56

57
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instead focusing analysis on the provision's effects on the parties' prior right to contract.
C. Dodd-Frank Held Inapplicable to Existing Arbitration
Agreements
Between the Pezza and Wong decisions, four district courts
declined to apply the Dodd-Frank arbitration provision retroactively to invalidate an existing arbitration agreement. In Henderson v Masco Framing Corp,65 the Nevada District Court
granted the plaintiffs motion to compel arbitration of his claim,
which alleged that he was discharged for complaining about improper tax withholdings.66 Henderson's claim was pending at the
time of Dodd-Frank's enactment.67
The Henderson court skipped the first prong of the Landgraf
test, noting the parties' arguments regarding congressional intent yet failing to rule on them.68 Instead, the court emphasized
that a presumption against retroactivity is most often applied to
"provisions affecting contractual or property rights, matters in
which predictability and stability are of prime importance."69
The court reasoned that the Supreme Court has characterized
"the right of the parties to agree to arbitration [as] a contractual
matter governed by contract law."70 Retroactive application of
the Dodd-Frank arbitration provision would "fundamentally interfere" with a right to contract for arbitration that existed prior
to the amendment.71
In holding that the Dodd-Frank provision invalidating
agreements to arbitrate SOX § 806 claims does not apply retroactively, other district courts largely followed Henderson's reasoning. In Holmes v Air Liquide USA LLC,72 the plaintiff argued
that the Dodd-Frank provision banning arbitration of § 806
claims also invalidated a general agreement to arbitrate any
employment-related claim, including her discrimination claims
arising under other statutes.73 The parties entered the arbitration
65

66
67
68
69

2011 WL 3022535 (D Nev).
See id at *1, 4.
See id at *1.

See id at *3-4.
Henderson, 2011 WL
70 Henderson, 2011 WL
S Ct 1740, 1752-53 (2011).
71 Henderson, 2011 WL
72 2012 WL 267194 (SD
73 See id at *4.

3022535 at *4, quoting Landgraf,511 US at 271.
3022535 at *4, citing AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion 131
3022535 at *4, citing Landgraf,511 US at 271.
Tex).
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agreement in question in 2006,74 but the complaint was filed after Dodd-Frank's enactment.75
The Holmes court avoided the question of the scope of
agreements invalidated by Dodd-Frank by finding the arbitration provision did not apply retroactively to the case. 76 The court
did not undertake its own analysis of congressional intent, noting that the Pezza court found no reliable evidence of congressional intent and the Henderson court implicitly agreed.77 The
court then reiterated the Henderson court's conclusion that
Dodd-Frank "would have a 'genuinely retroactive effect"' because it impacted contractual rights.78 Thus, the court concluded
that Dodd-Frank did not impact the enforceability of the parties'
general arbitration agreement.79
The DC District Court in Taylor v Fannie Maeo also followed the Henderson court's reasoning in enforcing a pre-DoddFrank arbitration agreement.8 ' In dicta,82 the South Carolina
District Court in Blackwell v Bank of America Corp83 stated that
Dodd-Frank did not preclude arbitration of a SOX § 806 claim
where the agreement to arbitrate predated Dodd-Frank.84 The
Blackwell court departed from the reasoning in Henderson by
finding that the general effective date included in Dodd-Frank

§ 4 is an "express term[ ]" precluding retroactive application of
the arbitration provision.85 Despite this finding, the Blackwell
court continued to the second Landgraf prong, finding retroactive application of the statute would interfere with "the parties'
contractual expectation [ ] that they would arbitrate."86

74 Appellees' Brief, Holmes v Air Liquide USA, LLC, No 12-20129, *8 (5th Cir filed
Aug 14, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 3560678).
75 See Holmes, 2012 WL 267194 at *1.
76 See id at *6.
77 See id at *6 n 2.
78 Id at *5, quoting Landgraf, 511 US at 277, 280 (quotation marks omitted).
79
See Holmes, 2012 WL 267194 at *6.
so 839 F Supp 2d 259 (DDC 2012).
81
See id at 261-63 (noting no other court has found "any express intent from Congress that [the provision] be applied retroactively" and concluding that retroactive application would impair "the parties' rights possessed when they acted").
82 See Blackwell v Bank of America Corp, 2012 WL 1229673, *4 n 3 (D SC) (noting
that because the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies, "the plaintiff has
not stated a SOX claim, and the Dodd-Frank Act amendments are irrelevant").
83 2012 WL 1229673 (D SC).
84 See id at *3.
a5 Id.
86 Id at *4.
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The preceding discussion summarizes the disagreement
among district courts as to whether the fifth Dodd-Frank
amendment invalidating agreements to arbitrate SOX § 806
claims applies retroactively to pending cases. The lower courts
assumed the appropriate unit of analysis for retroactivity questions is a single amendment, so a separate set of decisions addresses whether other Dodd-Frank amendments to SOX § 806
apply retroactively. Part II.D summarizes decisions considering
retroactive application of the Dodd-Frank amendment extending
§ 806 coverage to subsidiaries of public companies, as well as a
decision regarding the Dodd-Frank amendment extending the
statute of limitations for § 806 claims.
D.

Retroactive Application of Other Dodd-Frank Amendments
to SOX § 806

Lower courts disagree as to whether the Dodd-Frank
amendment adding express coverage of certain subsidiaries of
public companies to SOX § 806's scope applies retroactively.
That provision amends the statute's description of covered companies by inserting the following language: "including any subsidiary or affiliate whose financial information is included in the
consolidated financial statements of such company."87 Prior to
Dodd-Frank, no consensus existed among courts regarding
§ 806's coverage of such subsidiaries.88
In three different cases, the Southern District of New York
concluded that the subsidiaries provision applies retroactively
because it is a clarification, rather than a change of law.89 Ashmore v CGI Group Incso is largely representative of the court's
reasoning in all three cases. 9 ' Ashmore filed his claim of retaliatory discharge from a private subsidiary of a publicly traded
company after Dodd-Frank's enactment. 92
Dodd-Frank § 929A, 18 USC § 1514A(a).
See Hartsfield, 2 Investigating Employee Conduct § 12:34 at 12-204 to -05 (cited
in note 17).
89 See Leshinsky v Telvent GIT, SA, 873 F Supp 2d 582, 601 (SDNY 2012); Ashmore
v CGI Group Inc, 2012 WL 2148899, *3-4 (SDNY); Gladitsch v Neo@Ogilvy, 2012 WL
1003513, *4 (SDNY). See also Johnson v Siemens Building Technologies, Inc, 2011 WL
1247202, *11 (DOL ARB).
90 2012 WL 2148899 (SDNY).
91 In the other two cases, the judges disagreed as to how much deference to accord
the Administrative Review Board's retroactivity analysis. Compare Leshinsky, 873 F
Supp 2d at 589 (applying Skidmore deference), with Gladitsch, 2012 WL 1003513 at *4
& n 4 (applying Chevron deference).
92 See Ashmore, 2012 WL 2148899 at *3.
87

88
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The Ashmore court first noted, "the text of the 2010
amendment to § 806 does not express a clear intent that it apply
retroactively."93 It then adopted the Administrative Review
Board's analysis of "[1] whether the enacting body declared that
it was clarifying a prior enactment; [2] whether a conflict or ambiguity existed prior to the amendment; and [3] whether the
amendment is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the
prior enactment and its legislative history."94 The court concluded that the Dodd-Frank provision "is a clarification of Section
806 and does not create retroactive effects."95 In another of the
three cases, the Southern District of New York rejected the argument that the subsidiaries amendment should not apply retroactively because other courts declined to apply other DoddFrank provisions amending § 806 retroactively.96 The court thus
assumed that the proper unit of analysis is a single provisionthat the subsidiaries amendment should apply to pending cases
independently of any other Dodd-Frank amendment to § 806.97
In Mart v Gozdecki, Del Giudice, Americus & Farkas LLP,98

the Northern District of Illinois analyzed the same provision yet
reached the opposite conclusion, dismissing a legal malpractice
claim whose success depended on retroactive application of the
Dodd-Frank subsidiaries amendment to SOX § 806.99 The court
first reasoned that "the [pre-Dodd-Frank] language of the statute is plain and [ ] the vast majority of [administrative law judges] and federal courts that have reached the issue have concluded that section 806 did not extend protection to employees of
privately held subsidiaries."loo Thus, the court believed DoddFrank to be an alteration, rather than a clarification of § 806.101
The court then announced it would apply the Landgraf test, resolving the issue at the first prong by finding that Dodd-Frank's
general effective-date language precluded retroactive application.102
Finally, in addition to finding that the subsidiaries amendment applied to a claim arising prior to Dodd-Frank's enactment,
93

Id.

Id at *4 (alterations in original), quoting Middleton v City of Chicago, 578 F3d
655, 663-64 (7th Cir 2009).
95 Ashmore, 2012 WL 2148899 at *4, quoting Johnson,2011 WL 1247202 at *11.
96 See Leshinsky, 873 F Supp 2d at 601.
97 See id.
98 910 F Supp 2d 1085 (ND Ill 2012).
99 See id at 1095.
94

100 Id at 1094.
101
102

Id.
See Mart, 910 F Supp 2d at 1095.
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the Ashmore court also applied the 180-day limitations period
enacted in Dodd-Frank instead of the original 90-day limitations
period.1o3 The court did not engage in its own analysis of the issue, instead citing a Second Circuit case holding that a limitations period is a procedural matter, with the relevant conduct
being not "the primary conduct of the defendants, the alleged
discrimination, but [] instead the secondary conduct of the
plaintiffs, the filing of their suit."104 Although the Ashmore court
treated the retroactive application of the subsidiaries amendment and the retroactive application of the new limitations period as separate questions, the dearth of independent analysis of
the latter provision suggests that a desire to resolve the two
questions in the same way may have influenced the court.105
In sum, lower courts have all proceeded provision by provision, independently analyzing three of the five Dodd-Frank
amendments to SOX § 806, and have reached confusing, conflicting results. Two courts held that the provision banning agreements to arbitrate § 806 claims applies retroactively, while four
other courts held that the provision does not apply retroactively.106 One court concluded that the amendment expressly adding
subsidiaries of public companies to § 806's coverage does not apply to pending cases, while another decided the amendment does
apply to pending cases. 0 One court also applied the Dodd-Frank
provision extending the § 806 statute of limitations to pending
cases. 08 In short, a plaintiff whose § 806 claim was pending at
the time of Dodd-Frank's passage would have little hope of predicting which mix of SOX and Dodd-Frank provisions governs
the case.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE UNIT-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM

Part II surveyed cases considering whether Dodd-Frank
changes to SOX § 806 apply retroactively to pending cases.
Dodd-Frank made five such amendments to § 806, and the lower
10
104

See Ashmore, 2012 WL 2148899 at *5.
Vernon v CassadagaValley Central School District, 49 F3d 886, 889-90 (2d Cir

1995); Ashmore, 2012 WL 2148899 at *5, citing Vernon, 49 F3d at 889-90.
105 See Ashmore, 2012 WL 2148899 at *5.
106 Compare Wong, 890 F Supp 2d at 422-23, and Pezza, 767 F Supp 2d at 233-34,
with Blackwell, 2012 WL 1229673 at *3-4, Taylor, 839 F Supp 2d at 263, Holmes, 2012
WL 267194 at *6, and Henderson, 2011 WL 3022535 at *4.
107 Compare Mart, 910 F Supp 2d at 1095, with Leshinsky, 873 F Supp 2d at
601,
Ashmore, 2012 WL 2148899 at *3-4, and Gladitsch, 2012 WL 1003513 at *4.
108 See Ashmore, 2012 WL 2148899 at *5.
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courts all assumed that they should analyze each of these
changes independently.109 As a matter of simple math, if each
amendment may or may not apply to pending cases independently of the other four, then a court could conceivably create
thirty-two different iterations of the § 806 cause of action to govern cases pending at the time of Dodd-Frank's enactment. In
addition, the cases summarized in Part II indicate that jurisdictions disagree about how the Landgraf test applies to even a
single provision. Thus each jurisdiction might recognize a different iteration of the cause of action.
This variety is problematic for two reasons. First, when a
court analyzes only one new provision at a time despite the fact
that other related provisions were included in the same enactment, it may create a hybrid cause of action not envisioned by
Congress. In enacting SOX § 806, the 107th Congress created a
cause of action with a specific constellation of features, such as
the statute of limitations, the scope of coverage, and so forth.
When the 111th Congress subsequently changed the § 806 cause
of action through the five Dodd-Frank amendments, it endorsed
a cause of action comprised of a different constellation of features.
When a court applies just one of these five amendments to a
pending case without considering the other four amendments, it
mixes a feature endorsed by the 111th Congress with a constellation of features endorsed by the 107th Congress. In the case of
§ 806, there is evidence that SOX's enacting Congress would find
this approach objectionable, because it considered and rejected
several of the changes ultimately included in Dodd-Frank."o
When lower courts apply the Landgraf test on a provision-byprovision basis, they implicitly assume that legislators prefer a
hybrid cause of action to both the original version of the cause of
action and the later, updated version of the cause of action. In
the typical retroactivity case in which Congress is silent regarding retroactive application, support for this assumption is lacking. In other words, faced with choosing between applying an
enactment of one Congress and the enactment of another Congress, courts essentially decide to fabricate their own third
109 See, for example, Leshinsky v Telvent GIT, SA, 873 F Supp 2d 582, 601 (SDNY
2012); Landgraf,511 US at 280.
110 See S Rep No 107-146 at 22 (cited in note 9) (noting adoption of amendment reducing SOX whistleblower statute of limitations from 180 to 90 days and removing provision prohibiting compelled arbitration of SOX claims, among other provisions); S 2010,
107th Cong, 2d Sess, in 148 Cong Rec 2945 (Mar 12, 2002) (original Senate version of
bill).
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approach out of whole cloth. This is in tension with the Landgraf
Court's desire to vindicate legislative intent.
Second, the provision-by-provision approach undermines
other professed goals of retroactivity doctrine: to protect reliance-based interests and to allocate to Congress responsibility
for making reasoned judgments regarding retroactive application."' Part II canvassed the conflicted array of decisions regarding the law governing pending cases. Such variety makes it difficult for parties to have "confidence about the legal
consequences of their actions."112 Provision-by-provision analysis
also seems to undermine the professed goals of whistleblower
protections, as uncertainty about the applicable law is itself a
deterrent to whistleblowing.113 Furthermore, in Landgraf the
Court sought to "allocate[] to Congress responsibility for fundamental policy judgments concerning the proper temporal
reach of statutes."114 Provision-by-provision analysis, however,
lowers the stakes of delegating retroactivity questions to the judiciary-only one provision at a time is at risk. Piecemeal analysis may thus encourage legislators to abdicate decision-making
responsibility, undermining one of the central goals of the
Court's Landgrafframework.
The Dodd-Frank changes to SOX § 806 provide just one example of the unit-of-analysis problem in retroactivity doctrine.
As lengthy, complex enactments like Dodd-Frank or the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act"'1 become increasingly common, 116 the number of difficult retroactivity questions facing
courts will increase. This Comment argues that courts should
abandon the assumption that individual amendments within a
statute should be examined independently for retroactive effects, irrespective of the relationship between the amendments.
If courts persist in this assumption, we can expect omnibus enactments to spawn more piecemeal, conflicting retroactivity
111 See Landgraf,511 US at 266-68, 272-73.
112 Id at 266.
113 S Rep No 107-146 at 10 (cited in note 9) (explaining pre-SOX law was inadequate
because whistleblowers were "subject to the patchwork and vagaries of current state
laws").
114 Landgraf,511 US at 273.
115 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
116 See Krutz, Hitching a Ride at 5 (cited in note 3) ("[R]olling many measures into
one bill has become more common, the resulting bills span a greater number of diverse
policy areas, and significant policy change occurs through omnibus bills."); Klukowski, 16
Tex Rev L & Polit at 17 (cited in note 4) (noting a trend toward more lengthy enactments
and the corresponding challenges facing severability doctrine).
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decisions like those summarized in Part II. Case-by-case, provision-by-provision determination of whether a statute applies to
pending cases consumes significant judicial resources without
any concomitant benefits for parties seeking to understand the
governing law and without any indication this approach furthers
congressional intent.
Part III.A argues that lower courts are incorrect in assuming Landgrafrequires provision-by-provision analysis. Part III.B
borrows insights from severability doctrine to propose a test for
determining which provisions should be analyzed as a unit in
retroactivity cases. Part III.C applies the proposed test to this
Comment's case study, the five Dodd-Frank amendments to
SOX § 806.
A.

LandgrafFails to Address the Unit-of-Analysis Problem

Part II demonstrated that in determining whether DoddFrank applies retroactively, lower courts assumed, without explanation, that the appropriate unit of analysis is a single provision. To the extent this assumption is based on Landgraf, the
lower courts overreach. Landgraf does not address the unit-ofanalysis question with a generalizable rule. Rather, Landgrafs
only comment on the question is specific to the statute analyzed
in that case, the Civil Rights Act of 1991.117 Before proceeding to

analyze the Civil Rights Act's provisions individually, the Landgraf Court remarked, "there is no special reason to think that all
the diverse provisions of the [Civil Rights] Act must be treated
uniformly for [retroactivity] purposes."118 The Court grounded

this proposition in its extensive analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, concluding that Congress desired
piecemeal analysis.119 Landgrafthus purported to ratify the spe-

cific intent of a particular enacting body by analyzing the statute's provisions independently. It did not advocate for a broader
default rule of provision-by-provision analysis.
The Court had good reason to confine its analysis of the interdependency of the statute's provisions to the case at hand, as
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 presented an atypical retroactivity
case. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is
quite unusual-as the Supreme Court acknowledged. Before the
117

Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071, codified as amended at 42 USC

118 Landgraf,511 US at 280.
119 See id.

§ 2000e et seq.
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Act was ultimately signed into law, a predecessor bill including
express retroactivity clauses was presented to President George
H.W. Bush for his signature.120 The President vetoed the bill,
"citing the bill's 'unfair retroactivity rules' as one reason for his
disapproval."121 The Court thus found that congressional silence
in the bill ultimately signed into law
cannot realistically be attributed to oversight or to unawareness of the retroactivity issue. Rather, it seems likely
that one of the compromises that made it possible to enact
the 1991 version [of the Civil Rights Act] was an agreement
not to include the kind of explicit retroactivity command
found in the 1990 bill.122
However, in many cases where Congress passes omnibus legislation without expressly stating its temporal application, silence
likely does reflect mere "oversight or [ ] unawareness."123
The Landgraf Court's belief that the omission of an express
retroactivity clause in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was intentional undoubtedly contributed to its decision to analyze the
Act's provisions independently. The Court explained that silence
demonstrated that "legislators agreed to disagree about whether
and to what extent the Act would apply to preenactment conduct."124 Thus, as a compromise, legislators left the retroactive
application of the Act as "an open issue to be resolved by the
courts."125 For this reason, the Court rejected "the unsupported
assumption that Congress expected that all of the Act's provisions would be treated alike."126 The Court believed that Congress viewed piecemeal judicial resolution as the solution to a
problem it was "unable to resolve" itself.127 In other words, if the
Congress treated retroactive application of the statute as a binary question, deferring to the judiciary would not have been a viable compromise. The Court thus engaged in provision-byprovision analysis because it believed this approach ratified congressional intent.

120

Id at 255-56.

121

Id.
Landgraf, 511 US at 256.
Id.
Id at 263.
Id at 261.
Landgraf,511 US at 261 n 12.
Id at 261.

122
123
124
125
126
127
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Absent the unusual circumstances surrounding enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, there is no reason to believe Congress prefers provision-by-provision retroactivity analysis. The Landgraf decision certainly did not articulate any such
general reason, as it rooted the decision to proceed provision by
provision in the specific, unusual circumstances of the Civil
Rights Act's enactment. Furthermore, even if the Landgraf
Court had sought to articulate a default rule of piecemeal analysis, it is unclear this rule would bind the lower courts, as "the
Supreme Court does not give stare decisis effect to doctrines of
statutory interpretation methodology."128
Because the lower courts analyzed single provisions of
Dodd-Frank for retroactive effects independently and without
discussion of the appropriate unit of analysis, it is impossible to
know for certain whether they viewed Landgrafas the source of
their sub silentio default rule. What is clear is that Landgrafs
"no special reason" language cannot bear this weight.129 Rather,
the unique legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
suggests that when it comes to the appropriate unit of analysis,
Landgraf is the special case. Where there are no similar indications of congressional intent regarding piecemeal retroactivity
analysis, this Comment argues for filling the gap with a test derived from severability doctrine.
B.

Severability Doctrine Provides Insights into the Unit-ofAnalysis Problem in Retroactivity Doctrine

Both retroactivity and severability cases present the risk
that a "[c]ourt's decree [will create] its own new statutory regime, consisting of policies, risks, and duties that Congress did
not enact."130 Courts should borrow insights from severability

doctrine to determine the appropriate unit of analysis in retroactivity cases. Severability doctrine addresses how much of a statute must be invalidated when one provision is unconstitutional.
128

Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpreta-

tion Methodology?, 96 Georgetown L J 1863, 1866, 1874 (2008) ('The Supreme Court has
not explicitly addressed whether statutory interpretation methodology gets stare decisis
effect, but it has come tantalizingly close to stating that it does not."). Another scholar
has pointed out that binding rules of statutory interpretation may create Erie-doctrine
problems when applied to state statutes. See generally Ryan Scoville, The New General
Common Law of Severability, 91 Tex L Rev 543 (2013).
129 Landgraf, 511 US at 280.
130 See National Federationof Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566, 2668
(2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
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To decide how much of a statute to invalidate, courts consider
which provisions are so interrelated that they must stand or fall
together. 13,

The unit-of-analysis problem in retroactivity doctrine poses
a similar question. It requires determining which legislative
provisions are so interrelated that either none of them may apply to pending cases or all of them must together apply to pending cases. In essence, retroactivity doctrine needs a mechanism
for determining what portions of a statute cannot be severed
from each other in their temporal application. Severability doctrine is a natural place to turn for insights, as it addresses the
same problem of determining which statutory provisions are so
interdependent that a court may not unbundle them.
Part III.B.1 summarizes the Supreme Court's severability
test. Part III.B.2 argues that this test should be adopted in retroactivity cases, but with an important modification. In severability doctrine, a concern for judicial modesty underlies a norm
that courts should strive to invalidate only a single provision if
possible. In retroactivity doctrine, however, judicial modesty
counsels in favor of the opposite result-related provisions
should be kept together.
1. Severability framework.
In Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting

Oversight Board,132 the Supreme Court articulated the test for
determining how much of a statute to invalidate when one provision is held unconstitutional.133 That case held a SOX provision
unconstitutional and then severed the provision from the statute.13 4 The Free Enterprise severability test is "a sequential twostep framework.""'

The first step is functional. A court first asks whether the
act remains "fully operative as a law" without the constitutionally problematic provisions.136 Before Free Enterprise, this required

assessing "whether the statute will function in a manner consistent

See Part III.B.1.
130 S Ct 3138 (2010).
133 See id at 3161-62.
134 Id at 3161. Note that the provision at issue in Free EnterpriseFund is unrelated
to § 806, which is the focus of this Comment's case study.
135 Klukowski, 16 Tex Rev L & Polit at 54 (cited in note 4).
136 Free EnterpriseFund, 130 S Ct at 3161, quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc v Brock, 480
US 678, 684 (1987) (quotation marks omitted).
131

132
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with the intent of Congress" absent a severed provision.11 One
scholar argues that after Free Enterprise, the functional step is
about structural functionality, rather than congressional intent.
Under this view, the step examines "whether Provision A is
somehow dependent by reference or inference on an invalid Provision B, such that some aspect of Provision A is linguistically or
logically incapacitated or rendered nonsensical-or functionally
incapacitated-without Provision B."138 This view, however, is
contested. Subsequent to Free Enterprise, some members of the
Court argued that this step is not limited to structural concerns,
reiterating the earlier intent-based articulation of the test.139
That is, under this latter view, the statute's ability to function is
not simply a question of whether it becomes textually nonsensical without the unconstitutional provision; the relevant question
is whether it continues to further congressional purposes.
Whichever version of the functionality prong is applied, if the
remaining provisions do not function together, they are all
invalidated.140
The second step is indisputably intent based. A court should
"sustain [the statute's] remaining provisions '[u]nless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions . . . independently of that which is [invalid]."'141 That is,

"[c]ourts are to imagine that Congress was faced with a bill containing the statute minus the invalid provision, and determine
whether Congress would still have voted in favor of the bill."142
In doing so in Free Enterprise,the Court considered the statute's
text and "historical context."143
Applying this severability test, the Court operated from the
baseline assumption that "the 'normal rule' is that 'partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course."'144 Stated
another way, "when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, [the Court tries] to limit the solution to the problem."145 This
background understanding manifests itself in the second step of
137 Alaska Airlines, 480 US at 685.
138 Klukowski, 16 Tex Rev L & Polit at 56 (cited in note 4).
139 National Federationof Independent Business, 132 S Ct at 2668 (Scalia, Kennedy,

Thomas, and Alito dissenting) ("Even if the remaining provisions will operate in some
coherent way, that alone does not save the statute.").
140 See, for example, id at 2668-69 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
141 Free EnterpriseFund, 130 S Ct at 3161, quoting Alaska Airlines, 480 US at 684.
142 Klukowski, 16 Tex Rev L & Polit at 56-57 (cited in note 4).
143 Free EnterpriseFund, 130 S Ct at 3162.
144 Id at 3161, quoting Brockett v Spokane Arcades, Inc, 472 US 491, 504 (1985).
145 Ayotte v PlannedParenthoodof Northern New England,546 US 320, 328 (2006).
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the severability test, where a court severs only the unconstitutional provision "[u] nless it is evident that the Legislature would
not have enacted" the other provisions independently.146 That is,
courts search for evidence that the provisions are interdependent, rather than evidence that they are independent. Thus, such
evidence must overcome a presumption that the provisions are
independent. The exact role of this presumption in severability
doctrine is unclear: "while the Court has sometimes applied at
least a modest presumption in favor of . . . severability, it has

not always done so."147 To the extent that courts do deploy a presumption, it is a powerful one because the search for legislative
intent "can sometimes be 'elusive."'148
In Ayotte v Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,149 the Court explained the background rule of partial severance by reference to "[t]hree interrelated principles," all of
which reflect a desire for judicial modesty.5o In essence, Ayotte
explained that invalidation of a statute on constitutional
grounds raises particular concerns about the footprint of the
court's decision and its counter-majoritarian implications. That
is, after finding a statutory provision unconstitutional, courts
try to avoid performing radical surgery on a statute for fear of
displacing the more expert policy judgment of Congress, a democratically elected branch.151 By assuming a single provision may
be severed, courts leave "editorial freedom" to Congress, meaning legislators are "free to pursue any of [the] options going forward" for repackaging the statute without the unconstitutional
provision.152 Part III.B.2 examines the Ayotte judicial modesty
concerns in greater depth, demonstrating that in the retroactivity context, these same modesty concerns favor an assumption
that related provisions are interdependent.

146 Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S Ct at 3161 (emphasis added), quoting Alaska Airlines, 480 US at 684.
147 National Federationof Independent Business, 132 S Ct at 2668 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito dissenting) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
148 Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S Ct at 3161-62, quoting Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha, 462 US 919, 932 (1983).
149 546 US 320 (2006).
150 Id at 328-30.
151 See id.
152 Free EnterpriseFund, 130 S Ct at 3162.
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2. Severability framework transplanted to retroactivity
doctrine.
In retroactivity cases, courts should deploy the Free Enterprise severability test to determine how many provisions to analyze at once when applying Landgrafs second prong-with one
modification. In retroactivity cases, judicial modesty advises
courts to assume related provisions are interdependent, not independent, as severability cases sometimes presume. This Section describes the proposed test for determining whether related
provisions should be analyzed as a unit for retroactivity purposes. Part III.C applies the proposed test to the Comment's case
study, the five Dodd-Frank amendments to SOX § 806.
Under the test proposed by this Comment, a court should
conduct its analysis as follows: (1) analyze whether there is an
express congressional statement, (2) apply the unit-of-analysis
inquiry, and (3) apply the retroactive-effects inquiry. The first
Landgraf prong looks for an express congressional statement of
temporal application. This step must always come first, because
if Congress commands that a particular provision or provisions
apply to pending cases, that directive is followed.153 Absent an
express directive, the second prong of the Landgraftest requires
the court to determine whether application to pending cases
would yield retroactive effects.1>< Before considering the second

Landgraf prong, however, a court should determine how many
provisions to analyze as a unit. It should then apply that finding
when conducting the second prong analysis. This approach will
improve predictability for litigants, create better incentives for
Congress to decide retroactivity questions, and conserve judicial
resources.
First, the court should ask whether the provision would be
"fully operative as a law" if it alone applied to pending cases.155
While not recognized as its own step, in retroactivity cases
courts already engage in the structural-functionality version of
this analysis.156 If the provision cannot function alone, either because it would be incoherent without other provisions or because
153 See Landgraf, 511 US at 280.

154 See id.
155 Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S Ct at 3161, quoting Alaska Airlines, 480 US at 684.
156 See, for example, Landgraf, 511 US at 280-81 (acknowledging that a provision
creating a jury-trial right would normally apply to pending cases, but could not in the
instant case because the right was only afforded when certain remedies created by the
statute were available).
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it would not by itself be consistent with Congress's intent in enacting the statute, then related provisions must be analyzed
simultaneously. If the provision could function alone, the court
should proceed to the next question borrowed from severability
doctrine: Would Congress have enacted the provision as a
standalone measure?
It is at this second stage that a departure from the letter,
but not the spirit, of severability doctrine is required. As explained in Part III.A. 1, at this second stage in severability cases,
courts assume provisions are independent absent evidence to the
contrary. Thus, the court generally invalidates a single provision.157 In retroactivity cases, however, the rationales articulated
in Ayotte point to a different background principle: courts should
assume that related provisions are interdependent, absent evidence they are independent. Thus, the court would analyze related provisions simultaneously under the second prong of
Landgrafunless there is evidence that Congress would have enacted them individually.
This approach is consistent with the principles that guided
the Ayotte Court. Ayotte explained that "[flirst, we try not to nullify more of a legislature's work than is necessary, for we know
that '[a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the
elected representatives of the people."'18 In severability cases,
constitutional invalidation crowds out opportunities for more
democratic decision making, as it narrows the field of permissible legislative action. For this reason, courts excise the narrowest provision possible. In retroactivity cases, however, courts do
not serve as "the branch of last resort."159 The legislature may
override an "incorrect" decision with an express statement of
retroactivity.160 The error costs of declining to apply multiple
provisions of a statute to pending cases are thus significantly
lower. Furthermore, whereas constitutional invalidation is prospective and virtually permanent, retroactivity analysis deals
with a slice of time. No matter how a court answers retroactivity
questions, eventually the entire enactment will apply to all cases.
If a court analyzes just one provision at a time, congressional override becomes harder. Part II demonstrates that when
courts go provision by provision, a large number of conflicting,
157
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See Free EnterpriseFund, 130 S Ct at 3161.
Ayotte, 546 US at 329, quoting Regan v Time, Inc, 468 US 641, 652 (1984).
Klukowski, 16 Tex Rev L & Polit at 42 (cited in note 4).
See Landgraf,511 US at 267-68.
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but relatively low-stakes cases result. Provision-by-provision
analysis thus increases the costs to Congress of learning about
disagreeable decisions while also decreasing the stakes-and
thus the likelihood-of an override. When courts analyze related
provisions simultaneously, however, Congress has a single stimulus to which to respond.
The Ayotte Court's second rationale for narrow invalidation
was that because the Court's "constitutional mandate and institutional competence are limited, we restrain ourselves from 'rewrit[ing] state law to conform it to constitutional requirements'
even as we strive to salvage it."161 That is, the courts avoid undertaking "quintessentially legislative work" by invalidating the
smallest statutory provision possible.162 In retroactivity cases,
however, it is piecemeal analysis that tends toward legislativelike outcomes. The case-by-case character of these decisions
yields a judicially created hybrid cause of action. If courts instead assume that related provisions are interdependent, then
the law applying to pending cases is either the original enactment or the later enactment. No amalgamation of provisions endorsed by different general assemblies would occur.
The final Ayotte rationale for narrow intervention was that
"the touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent, for a court cannot 'use its remedial powers to circumvent
the intent of the legislature."'163 The Court reasoned that "we try
not to nullify more of a legislature's work than is necessary, for
we know that '[a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates [legislators'] intent."'164 That is, in severability cases the Court's decision to nullify some part of the statute will always conflict with
the congressional intent that the entire statute be in force. Thus,
in severability cases, courts disturb as few provisions as possible. This concern does not translate to retroactivity cases, however, because if the legislature expresses its intent regarding
retroactivity, that directive is followed at the first stage of analysis. In these situations, the second stage at which a presumption of interdependence would apply is never reached. Furthermore, the mere fact of the statute's passage is not probative of
161 Ayotte, 546 US at 329 (alteration in original), quoting Virginia v American
Booksellers Association, Inc, 484 US 383, 397 (1988).
162 Ayotte, 546 US at 329.
163 Id at 330, quoting Califano v Westcott, 443 US 76, 94 (1979) (Powell concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
164 Ayotte, 546 US at 329 (first alteration in original), quoting Regan, 468 US at 652.
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whether Congress intended it to apply to pending cases. Congressional intent is inherently more ambiguous in the retroactivity context.
Thus, the judicial-modesty concerns animating severability
doctrine's assumption that provisions are independent do not
translate directly to the retroactivity context. Accordingly, in determining the unit of analysis in retroactivity cases, courts
should not import the assumption from severability doctrine
that the narrowest possible intervention is preferable.
One possible alternative to this Comment's proposed approach is that in retroactivity analysis there simply is no stable
unit of analysis, and courts must assess congressional intent on
a retail basis to determine which provisions are to be held together. This approach would still be lacking, however, because it
would require an expenditure of significant judicial resources in
pursuit of what may often be an illusory inquiry. After all, when
the text of a statute is silent as to its retroactive application,
there is a strong possibility the silence is due to Congress's
"oversight or [ ] unawareness of the retroactivity issue."165 Legislative history simply may not provide any information regarding
which provisions Congress intended to be interdependent for
retroactivity purposes. A gap-filling default rule is needed.
Courts should thus go one step further and reverse the severability presumption, meaning that related provisions should
be assumed to be interdependent in their temporal application.
Doing so would vindicate the LandgrafCourt's dual goals of creating predictability and of allocating retroactivity determinations to Congress. When courts assume related provisions are
interdependent, they are all less likely to apply to pending cases-if one provision has retroactive effects, neither it nor the related provisions apply to pending cases. Thus, litigants are less
likely to be surprised by retroactive application of statutory provisions, and Congress has greater incentive to speak if it wants
legislation to apply to pending cases.
Furthermore, insofar as retroactivity doctrine seeks to ratify
congressional intent, applying either the original or updated
version of a statute to pending cases intuitively seems more likely to conform to this intent than does the creation of a third, hybrid statute. Accordingly, where a statute lacks express language indicating its temporal application, courts should analyze

165 Landgraf,511 US at 256.
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related provisions together as a unit for retroactive effects unless
there is evidence Congress would have enacted them individually.
C. The Proposed Framework for Retroactivity Analysis Applied
to the Five Dodd-Frank Changes to SOX § 806
Part III.B proposed a new framework for analyzing whether
a civil statute should apply retroactively. This Section applies
that framework to the five Dodd-Frank amendments to the SOX
§ 806 whistleblower retaliation cause of action, which are: (1)
express coverage of certain subsidiaries of public companies, (2)
expanded coverage to national statistical ratings organizations,
(3) creation of a jury-trial right, (4) extension of the statute of
limitations, and (5) prohibition of agreements to waive or arbitrate claims.166 In applying the proposed framework to these

amendments, this Comment also seeks to resolve methodological
differences among the lower courts regarding the Landgraf test.
Even though the proposed framework reduces the number of
possible permutations, predictability cannot be achieved unless
courts also agree on the basics.
1. Step one: express congressional intent inquiry.
The first step of the proposed framework is simply to apply
Landgrafs first prong, which requires determining "whether
Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach."167
The Pezza court correctly concluded that there is no express
statement of the arbitration provision's temporal reach.168 Nor

does an express statement accompany the other four DoddFrank provisions.169 The Blackwell and Mart courts erred in

finding the statute's general effective date to be an express
statement of the statute's temporal application, as when faced
with nearly identical language, the Landgraf Court explicitly rejected this possibility.170
166
167
168

169

See Dodd-Frank §§ 922, 929A, 18 USC § 1514A(a), (b)(2)(D)-(E), (e).
Landgraf, 511 US at 280.
Pezza, 767 F Supp 2d at 234; 18 USC § 1514A(e).

See Dodd-Frank §§ 922, 929A, 18 USC § 1514A(a), (b)(2)(D)-(E), (e).

Compare Landgraf, 511 US at 257 (finding statement that "[e]xcept as otherwise
specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect
upon enactment" not dispositive of the retroactivity question), with Mart, 910 F Supp 2d
at 1095 ("Dodd-Frank unequivocally sets forth its effective date, noting that that [sic]
the amendments are to 'take effect 1 day after enactment."'), and Blackwell, 2012 WL
1229673 at *3 ("By their express terms, the statutory amendments on which plaintiff
relies were not effective until 'the day after' July 21, 2010.").
170
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Second, the Pezza court was correct to explore, but ultimately reject, the negative inference that "the fact that Congress has
explicitly directed that another section of a given statute not be
applied in pending cases may be viewed as evidence that Congress intended, at least implicitly, the remainder of the statute
to apply thereto."171 While Dodd-Frank does include some retroactivity clauses,172 the contrast in statutory language does not
appear deliberate, as required by the Court to justify a negative
inference,173 and the sections "address wholly distinct subject
matters."174 It is worth underscoring that if there were an express retroactivity statement, the inquiry would stop at the
first Landgraf prong.175 The Blackwell court apparently believed otherwise.176
2. New step two: unit-of-analysis inquiry.
Having found no express statement of congressional intent,
the next step is to determine whether the five Dodd-Frank
amendments should be analyzed as a single unit.
First, a court should ask whether any of the five provisions
would be unable to "fully operat[e] as a law" if applied to a pending case by itself.77 Whether a structural or intent-based approach to functionality is preferable is beyond the scope of this
Comment. For the Dodd-Frank case study, the difference is immaterial. None of the five amendments are structurally linked in
a way that makes them nonsensical if separated. Furthermore,
Pezza, 767 F Supp 2d at 228.
See Dodd-Frank § 921, 15 USC §§ 78o(o), 80b-5(f) (giving SEC rulemaking authority to regulate arbitration of "any future dispute" between customers or clients of
any broker, dealer, or municipal-securities dealer, or between customers or clients and
an investment advisor); Dodd-Frank § 1028, 12 USC § 5518 (giving the new Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau rulemaking authority to regulate arbitration of "any future
dispute" between a consumer and "a covered person"). While these provisions relate to
arbitration, they address consumer protection issues and not whistleblower claims. Congress's desire to delegate only prospective rulemaking authority to an administrative
agency provides no insights as to whether it intended outright statutory bans on arbitration to apply only prospectively.
173 See Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 576 (2006) (finding negative inference
that paragraph (1) does not apply retroactively appropriate because "only paragraphs (2)
and (3) of subsection (e) [of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005] are expressly made applicable to pending cases").
174 See Martin v Hadix, 527 US 343, 356 (1999).
175 Landgraf,511 US at 280.
176 See Blackwell, 2012 WL 1229673 at *3-4 (finding that the general effective date
provides an express retroactivity statement yet proceeding to prong two).
177 See Free EnterpriseFund, 130 S Ct at 3161, quoting Alaska Airlines, 480 US at 684.
171

172
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retroactive application of any one amendment would appear to
"function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress."178
Congress intended that "more claims ... be pursued and reme-

died in the court system," and applying any one of the five
amendments to pending cases would be consistent with this
goal.179
Next, the related provisions must be analyzed as a unit absent evidence that Congress would have enacted the provisions
individually. In the case of the amendment extending coverage
to subsidiaries, there is such evidence. That provision was included in the initial House version of Dodd-Frank, months before the other four provisions were introduced, and it also appeared in the Senate version of the bill.180 Furthermore, it
appeared in a different section of Dodd-Frank than the other
four provisions.181 Thus, the subsidiaries amendment would be

analyzed separately from the other four Dodd-Frank amendments for retroactive effects.
In contrast, either all or none of the remaining four provisions should apply to pending cases. The legislative history of
Dodd-Frank is devoid of evidence that Congress would have enacted them individually. The provisions extending the statute of
limitations, adding a jury-trial right, and banning waivers of
claims and predispute arbitration agreements were all added at
the same stage in the legislative process-the conference committee-and in the same section of the bill, suggesting Congress
conceived of these provisions as one bundle.182 The statistical
ratings organization coverage amendment was added earlier in
the legislative process, appearing in the Senate version of the
bill.183 That provision, however, never appeared as a standalone

provision in the House, and the conference committee amendments were ultimately added to the same section of the bill as
the statistical ratings organization amendment. Since these four
178 Alaska Airlines, 480 US at 685.
179 See Moore, 12 Pepperdine Disp Resol L J at 514 (cited in note 37).
180 Compare Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, HR 4173,
111th Cong, 1st Sess § 7607 (2009), and Restoring America's FinancialStability Act of
2010, HR 4173, 111th Cong, 2d Sess § 929A (2010), with Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer ProtectionAct, HR Rep No 111-517, 111th Cong, 2d Sess 486 (2010).
181 Compare Dodd-Frank § 929A with Dodd-Frank § 922.
182 Compare HR 4173, 111th Cong, 1st Sess § 7203 (2009), and HR 4173, 111th
Cong, 2d Sess § 922 (2012), with Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, HR Rep No 111-517, 111th Cong, 2d Sess 482 (2010).
183 Restoring America's FinancialStabilityAct of 2010, 111th Cong, 2d Sess § 922(b)
(2012).
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provisions all amend the same cause of action and there is no evidence Congress would have enacted them individually, the new,
proposed framework's presumption of interdependence applies.
3. Step three: retroactive effects inquiry.
Having determined that four Dodd-Frank amendments to
SOX § 806 are to be analyzed as a unit, the second Landgraf
prong asks "whether the new statute would have retroactive effect."84 If any one of the four provisions would have retroactive
effect, none of the four provisions apply to pending cases. Analysis under the second Landgrafprong should focus on functional
considerations of "retroactive effect," and "legal consequences."185

Courts should refrain from reducing the inquiry to a "simple or
mechanical task" by compiling citations characterizing a provision as substantive versus procedural or jurisdictional.186 Landgraf does not hold that such characterizations are dispositive of
a provision's retroactive effect, and courts should take care not
to place undue weight on how a provision has been characterized
in other contexts. For example, the Supreme Court held statutes
of limitation to be substantive in the Erie-doctrine187 context, but
procedural in the choice-of-law context.<8 "Substance" and "procedure" are not self-explanatory terms. 89
A functional analysis supports Henderson's conclusion that
the Dodd-Frank arbitration provision has retroactive effects.
While the provision changes the forum that will hear the case, if
applied retroactively, the provision would also invalidate agreements for which the parties otherwise had the right to bargain,190 thus "impair[ing] rights a party possessed when he act-

ed."191 When negotiating terms of employment, for example,
employers may have offered greater compensation in exchange
for an agreement to arbitrate. Invalidating this deal would im184 Landgraf,511 US at 280.
185 Id at 270 (emphasis added).
186 Id at 268.
187 Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938).

188 Compare Guaranty Trust Co v York, 326 US 99, 110 (1945), with Sun Oil Co v
Wortman, 486 US 717, 726 (1988).
189 See Sun Oil, 486 US at 726 (explaining that "what ['substance' and 'procedure]
mean in a particular context is largely determined by the purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn").
190 See Hartsfield, 2 Investigating Employee Conduct § 12:34 at 12-217 to -18 (cited
in note 17) (noting courts enforced agreements to arbitrate SOX whistleblower claims
prior to Dodd-Frank).
191 Landgraf,511 US at 280.
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pose an unanticipated burden on the party that paid more up
front to avoid costly litigation later, undermining the "predictability and stability" that are "of prime importance" to contract
law.192 While many such agreements are general boilerplate,
those concerns are better policed through contract doctrine than
indirectly through retroactivity analysis.'93
The Pezza decision is unresponsive to the concern that retroactive application will impair contract rights. To support its
"view that this section principally concerns the type of jurisdictional statute envisioned in Landgraf," the court cites Federal
Arbitration Act cases asking whether arbitration would impair
statutory rights-the equivalent of asking whether arbitration
would impair a whistleblower's right not to be fired for protected
conduct.194 The Henderson court and its adherents, however, argue that retroactive application would impair a right independent of the statute: contract rights.196 The Henderson reasoning is
persuasive, and the Pezza court gave it insufficient weight when
it merely noted in passing that "[c]ourts have refused to apply
retroactively state statutes voiding certain arbitration provisions on the basis that such statutes affected contractual rights
and therefore has retroactive effect."196

Because the arbitration provision would have retroactive effect, neither it nor the three other Dodd-Frank amendments determined to be the unit of analysis should apply to pending cases.
CONCLUSION

When considering whether a new statute applies to pending
cases, courts should not assume that each provision must always
be analyzed individually under Landgraf.That case provides no
such default rule, and provision-by-provision analysis yields an
unpredictable array of hybrid statutes governing preenactment
conduct, whereby different permutations of the old and new
statutes apply to pending cases.

192 Id at 271.
193 See, for example, Taylor, 839 F Supp 2d at 263.
194 Pezza, 767 F Supp 2d at 233-34, citing Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp,
500 US 20, 26 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/American Express, Inc, 490 US
477, 486 (1989); Desiderio v National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc, 191 F3d 198,
205-06 (2d Cir 1999).
195 See Henderson, 2011 WL 3022535 at *4.
196 Pezza, 767 F Supp 2d at 233.
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This unit-of-analysis problem is not unique to the DoddFrank context. Given the trend toward longer, more complicated
pieces of legislation, courts can expect to confront more challenging retroactivity questions. For example, the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 sparked a
flurry of retroactivity litigation over its myriad provisions, which
continued for decades.197 More recently, courts have been asked
to decide the retroactive application of the OPEN Government
Act of 2007, the 2008 Amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Veterans Benefits Act of 2010, to name a
few.198 An across-the-board assumption by courts that every

statute's provisions must be analyzed individually leaves litigants little hope of knowing the law applicable to pending cases.
Severability doctrine provides a useful framework for thinking about the unit-of-analysis problem in retroactivity cases, as
it confronts the question of when statutory provisions are so interrelated that they may not be separated. Declaring a statute
unconstitutional, however, is much harsher medicine than prescribing its temporal application. Accordingly, when applying
the severability test in retroactivity cases, courts should abandon the assumption that provisions are independent of one another. Faced with a statute that is ambiguous about its temporal
application, courts should analyze related provisions as a unit
absent evidence that Congress would have enacted them individually. Doing so will create greater predictability for litigants
and less work for courts.

197 See 3B Am Jur 2d Aliens and Citizens § 1517 (2013) (collecting cases on retroactive application of IIRIRA).
198 See Gordon v Pete's Auto Service of Denbigh, Inc, 637 F3d 454, 457 (4th Cir 2011)
(examining whether § 802 of the Veterans' Benefits Act of 2010 providing an express
cause of action applies to pending cases); Singh v George Washington University School
of Medicine and Health Sciences, 667 F3d 1, 4 (DC Cir 2011) (considering retroactive application of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008); Summers v Department of Justice, 569
F3d 500, 504 (DC Cir 2009) (examining whether attorney's fees were retroactively available under the OPEN Government Act of 2007).

BB

